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The Instruction Ritual
By ROBERT L. WINSLOW'
"One of the greatest fictions known to the law is that a jury of 12
laymen can hear a judge read a set of instructions once, then under-
stand them, digest them and correctly apply them to the facts in the
case. It has taken the judge and the lawyers years of study to under-
stand the law as stated in those instructions."1
Judge Frank J. Swain
THE ABOVE could be a quotation from almost any California trial
judge or attorney. We state it with pathological frequency-as if the
recognition of the problem would eliminate it and permit us, in good
conscience, to proceed with our instruction ritual. After the argument
to the jury, we judges don our robes and go forth in the battle of jus-
tice v. evil with our "Book."2 Our part in the trial is beginning, our
script is set, the scriptual lesson for the day is "negligence." The lan-
guage must not vary except that we might insert the names of the
parties.3 We must not however deviate from "approved legal lan-
guage." 4 Any desire to make the ritual understandable must be sup-
pressed for we must correctly state the law even if it is not understood.5
To make the script understandable would be to risk reversal for an
understandable statement would not be in "approved legal language."
° LL.B., Stanford University Law School, 1949; Judge, Superior Court, Mendocino
County.
1 Swain, J., Common Sense in Jury Trials, 30 CAL. S. BAR J. 405, 412 (1955).
2 CALIFORNIA JUnY INSTRUCTIONS-CIvIL (4th rev. ed. 1956). (Sometimes called
Book of Approved Jury Instructions-BAJI.) This work will hereafter be referred to as
BAJI.
3 The lawyer who submits BAJI instructions "with the possible exception of a few
special instructions which he believes the case requires" is described as cooperative.
I BAJI 3-4. Furthermore, in actual practice the language is seldom varied except for
names. It has at times been suggested that the legislature should set forth the language
to be used. See Panel Discussion, 47 CALIF. L. REv. 888, 897 (1959).
4 "In stating an instruction on the law in approved legal language, simplicity and
understandability may often be sacrificed to achieve accuracy and comprehensiveness."
2 WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE § 55, at 1783 (1954).
The authors of BAJI state: "The one thing an instruction must do above all else
is correctly state the law. This is true regardless of who is capable of understanding it."
1 BAJI 44.
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The foregoing parody is designed to point up the problem which
is the subject of this article. As might be inferred this will be a critical
evaluation of the present system of instructing juries with some sug-
gestions for the improvement thereof. While there will be occasional
reference to the substantive law, there will be no detailed treatment
of it.8
As is implicitly recognized in Judge Swain's statement, our pur-
pose in giving jury instructions is obviously to inform and thereby
assist the jury in arriving at a just verdict. We are trying to inform
the jury of the relationships between people, events and legal conse-
quences. This is done by means of words but the words are not them-
selves the relationships. Each juror must interpret our words in a
manner which gives him a concept of the relationship between people,
events and legal consequences which is the same as that of the judge.
Our degree of success in instructing will be dependent upon the degree
to which the judge and jury attach the same meaning to the words used.7
Present Method of Instructing Jurors
Instructions are given at the end of the trial after argument and
just before the jury retires to deliberate.8 Prior thereto, each counsel
submits a set of jury instructions to the court.9 Just before the argu-
ment, the court must, upon request of counsel, advise counsel of the
instructions which it proposes to give. 10
"For detailed analysis of the substantive law see 1 STARDRmY, CALIFORNIA TRIAL
AND APPELLATE PRACTICE § 620 (1958); 2 Wnan, CALrIFONLA PROCEDuRE § 61 (1954).
7 "The test is the reasonable clearness of the definitions to enable an understanding
of the word by the jurors. The one important office of a definition or explanation is to
make clear and understandable the issues or instructions which it accompanies." Texaco
Country Club v. Wade, 163 S.W.2d 219, 222 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942).
s CAL. CODE Civ. Paoc. § 607 sets forth the order of proceedings in a jury case and
provides that after argument the court may charge the jury. The section also provides
that the court for "special reasons" may vary the order.
9 CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 607(a): "In every case which is being tried before the
court with a jury, it shall be the duty of counsel for the respective parties, before the first
witness is sworn, to deliver to the judge presiding at the trial and serve upon opposing
counsel, all proposed instructions to the jury covering the law as disclosed by the plead-
ings. Thereafter, and before the commencement of the argument, counsel may deliver
to such judge, and serve upon opposing counsel, additional proposed instructions to the
jury upon questions of law developed by the evidence and not disclosed by the pleadings.
All proposed instructions shall be typewritten, each on a separate sheet of paper. Before
the commencement of the argument, the court, on request of counsel, must: (1) decide
whether to give, refuse, or modify the proposed instructions; (2) decide which instruc-
tions shall be given in addition to those proposed, if any; and (3) advise counsel of all
instructions to be given. However, if, during the argument, issues are raised which have
not been covered by instructions given or refused, the court may, on request of counsel,
give additional instructions on the subject matter thereof."
10 CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 607(a).
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The form of the instructions to be given is up to the judge and no
one has a right to a statement in any particular language." As a prac-
tical matter, however, most juries are instructed in the language of
BAJI. 12
BAJI is a form book containing jury instructions that have been
approved by the judges of the Los Angeles County Superior Court.
It covers most of the situations which come up in trial-particularly
in negligence trials. The book is divided into several parts: there are
general instructions dealing with the duties of jurors, evidence and
how it should be considered, etc. These are followed by instructions
on negligence and liability therefor, including basic definitions. In-
structions follow on issues to be decided and on burden of proof, which
in turn are followed by instructions on damages. There are also in-
structions covering special duties and relationships and a final section
covering the Federal Employer's Liability Act.
The excellence of BAJI is attested to by the fact that BAJI instruc-
tions have often been approved by the appellate courts. 13 Further
testimonial to its quality may be found in the fact that it is almost
universally used by the courts and by trial counsel in preparation of
their jury instructions. As a matter of fact many, if not most, judges
read the instructions to the jury in the exact language of BAJI. Fur-
thermore, counsel are encouraged to submit the instructions in the
exact language of BAJI and are discouraged from making any substan-
tial variation in the language. 14 In many superior courts the language
of BAJI has become the only language used.
Generally BAJI instructions are stated in abstract form. Defini-
tions are common.' 5 A good example of the format is the instruction: 16
Negligence is the doing of an act which a reasonably prudent person
would not do, or the failure to do something which a reasonably
prudent person would do, actuated by those considerations which
112 WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE § 52 (1954); Johns v. Ward, 170 Cal. App.
2d 780, 339 P.2d 926 (1959).
12 "The counties, almost without exception, reported the use of BAJI form....
Only a few counties used their own pre-approved instructions and these, in general, con-
sisted of adaptations or paraphrases of BAJI forms." CIvIL PROCEDURE DUrIc TRIAL 431
(Cal. C.E.B. 1960).
13 The headnotes to BAJI instructions cite cases which have approved them.
14 See Reed v. Stroh, 54 Cal. App. 2d 183, 128 P.2d 829 (1942), where the court
suggests that instructions conform to BAJI.
15 Definitions from BAJI include: Burden of Proof and Preponderance of Evidence
(BAJI 21); Direct and Indirect Evidence (BAJI 22, 22D); Propensity (BAJI 22A); Pre-
sumption (BAJI 22B); Agent (BAJI 54B); Independent Contractor (BAJI 54F); Neg-
ligence (BAJI 101); Ordinary Care (BAJI 102); Contributory Negligence (BAJI 103);
Proximate Cause (BAJI 109) etc.
16BAJI 101 (Supp. 1959).
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ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs. It is the failure to
use ordinary care in the management of one's property or person.
Negligence is not an absolute term but a relative one. By this we
mean that in deciding whether there was negligence in a given case
the conduct in question must be considered in the light of all the sur-
rounding circumstances as shown by the evidence.
Having given a definition of negligence in the terms of ordinary
care, BAJI then contains a definition of ordinary care. There are also
definitions of contributory negligence and proximate cause. After all
these definitions are given to the jury, the court will normally advise
them of the issues to be determined. BAJI sets forth forms to be used
in so doing. These "issue" instructions17 are framed in the language of
the previously defined legal terms, e.g., Was defendant negligent?
Was that negligence the proximate cause of injury to plaintiff? Was
plaintiff negligent? Did plaintiff's negligence contribute as a proxi-
mate cause of his injuries?
Obviously each juror in assimilating the issue instructions, must
refer back mentally to the definition of the terms "negligence," "proxi-
mate cause," etc.
Instructions following the above format are particularly vulnerable
to the indictment of Judge Swain. The vice is in the abstract nature
of the instructions. Such instructions assume that the juror can learn
the meaning of a word, e.g., negligence, from the definition.' The
pattern is to remove the instructions from any factual context and
leave it to the juror to relate the definitions to the facts. This is done
in spite of the fact that we lawyers have not derived our concepts of
negligence, proximate cause, contributory negligence, etc., from defi-
nitions. We have derived our concepts of these terms from a study
of factual situations where negligence has been found to exist or not
to exist; where proximate cause has been found to exist or not to
exist; we have derived our concepts and meanings from a study of the
contexts in which the terms have been found to be applicable or not
1 BAJI 112-14.
's Works on semantics would indicate that this is not so. One leading semanticist
has said: "We learn the meanings of practically all our words (which are, it will be
remembered, merely complicated noises), not from dictionaries, not from definitions, but
from hearing these noises as they accompany actual situations in life .. ." HAYAKAWA,
LANGUAGE IN Thourrr AND ACTION 57 (1949). Other works on semantics which em-
phasize this point are: Konzynsnr, SCIENCE AmD SAN ry; STuART CHASE, TYRANNY OF
WORDS; WENDELL JOHNSON, PEOPLE IN QuANxDsS; OGDEN & RICHA.Ds, THE MEANING
OF MEANING. All of these works emphasize the futility of attempting to communicate
meaning by the use of abstract definitions. To derive meaning we must be able to relate
the words to our own experience as stored in our memory. We must be able to give the
words a factual context.
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applicable. 19 Obviously such an approach cannot be used with the jury
because of time limitations, but as indicated later, we may be able to
come closer to giving the terms a context from which meaning can be
derived by relating the instructions to the case being tried by the jury.
Instructions on Negligence
Both the "negligence" 20 and "ordinary care"2 1 instructions are de-
fined in terms of the "reasonably prudent person." Whether such a
definition is helpful will again depend upon whether the jury attaches
the same meaning as does the judge to the term "reasonably prudent
person." It seems to the writer that this term is almost as technical and
abstract as are the terms which we are attempting to define. Probably
my point and the defect in the above instructions can be clarified by
an example. The actual context for our example is the following:
Jane Doe while parked at a traffic light is hit from behind by
Richard Roe, suffering severe injuries. She files suit. At the trial Rich-
ard Roe admits the events but claims that he was blinded by the sun
as it set in the West. Contributory negligence is not asserted as an
an issue. Miss Doe is represented at the trial by A. Winner and Mr.
Roe is represented by Will Avoid. In such a situation we might give
a liability instruction as follows:
"Ladies and Gentlemen: the law requires that you and I, the attor-
neys, Richard Roe and Jane Doe, each use the same degree of care,
the same amount of care, as would an ordinarily careful person in the
light of the surrounding circumstances. If Mr. Roe in this case did
not exercise that amount of care and as a result hit Miss Doe, then he
would be responsible for the accident.
"You will notice that I previously stated that we are all required
to exercise a certain amount of care. In this connection it is not the
extraordinarily careful person nor the exceptionally skillful one that
we have to follow in our actions, and that Mr. Roe had to follow
in driving his car, but it is the ordinarily careful person. We are con-
cerned in this case with whether Mr. Roe acted as an ordinarily
careful person under the circumstances shown by the evidence. Did
he use ordinary care in the management and control of his car? Did
19 Lexicographers derive the meanings set forth in dictionaries by a similar method.
They collect and study the way words are used. See Preface to WEBSTER, NEW INTER-
NATIONAL DICTIONARY (3rd ed. 1961).
20 BAJI 101 (Supp. 1959).
21 "The amount of caution required of a person in the exercise of ordinary care de-
pends upon the danger which is apparent to him or should be apparent to a reasonably
prudent person in the particular situation and circumstances involved." BAJI 102A
(Supp. 1959).
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he use that care which persons of ordinary carefulness operating a
vehicle on Road "X" in Boomtown would use to avoid injury to other
users of the road?
"Now, if a person of ordinary carefulness with the same knowledge
and in the same position as Mr. Roe would have foreseen or antici-
pated that someone might have been injured as a result of the manner
in which he was driving his vehicle under the circumstances which
have been shown by the evidence, and if this risk of injury to others
reasonably could have been avoided, then not to avoid it would make
Mr. Roe responsible or liable for any injuries resulting therefrom."
The suggested instruction initially draws the attention of the jurors
to themselves and to the people who have been participating in the
trial with them.22 It relates the standard of care to the jurors and
points up the relationship of the care exercised and the responsibility
of the actor in simplified terminology. The amount of care that is re-
quired is that of "an ordinarily careful person" not "a reasonably pru-
dent person." The former language is preferable to that commonly
used because the wording is less likely to be misunderstood.
In normal conversation the term "prudent" is less commonly used
than is the term "careful." By reason of this, the jurors are less likely
to have a common understanding of the meaning of the term "prudent"
than of the term "careful." Terms which are commonly used should
be preferred over terms which are rarely used, for the former are more
likely to have a common meaning to all of the jurors.23 Furthermore,
the word "prudent"24 carries connotations of thrift and other connota-
tions which have no relationship to the standard of care required by
the law.
The term "reasonably"25 is objectionable for it has the possible
connotation of "to a fairly sufficient extent" which in turn might be
thought to require a quite substantial degree of care. The term "ord-
narily' 26 in the context of this instruction is less likely to be misunder-
stood than the term "reasonably." The term "ordinarily" does not
carry the connotation of "to a fairly sufficient extent" and eliminates
this problem. Furthermore, it carries the connotation of normal or not
uncommon. The use of the term "ordinarily" was approved in Tucker
22 It is thought that this will create greater interest in the juror and permit him to
identify with the speaker. It will call up his memories of the trial to give context to the
instructions.
23 Obviously jurors will not derive any meaning from our instructions unless the
terms used are familiar to them.
24 See W sE, Nmv INTERNATIONAL DIcnoNARY (3rd ed. 1961).
2 5 See note 24 supra.
26 See note 24 supra.
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v. Lombardo,27 where an instruction used the term "ordinarily pru-
dent person." Furthermore, the editors of BAJI have used the term
interchangeably with "reasonably," for in the instruction on Ordinary
Care set forth in the bound volume they use the following language:
"Ordinary care is that care which persons of ordinary prudence . . ."
and in Instruction 102A set forth in the supplement they use the fol-
lowing language: "the amount of caution required of a person in the
exercise of ordinary care depends upon the danger which is apparent
to him or should be apparent to a reasonably prudent person . . .",
thereby equating a person of ordinary prudence with a reasonably
prudent person. Throughout the instructions in BAJI, the terms "rea-
sonably" and "ordinarily" seem to be used interchangeably. The ob-
vious inference from BAJI and the cases is that either term is con-
sidered adequate by the courts. However, the term we use to instruct
the jury should be the term that will more nearly convey the meaning
which we intend to the jurors. I submit that this term is "ordinarily."
In Paragraph 2 of the proposed substitute instruction, we have at-
tempted to relate the standard of care to the jurors by the use of the
term "we," identifying the jurors with the court and the parties. We
have specifically eliminated the person of extra or exceptional skill as
setting the standard and have attempted to relate the actions of the
ordinarily careful person to the facts of the case which the jury has
heard. You will note that the suggested instruction does not set forth
a definition, as such, of either "negligence" or "ordinary care," while
the substance of the definitions found in BAJI have been included in
the proposed instruction in the form of an explanation centering
around the jurors and the facts of the case. Such instruction if given
in the hypothesized case might very appropriately be followed by in-
dividual adaptations of other BAJI instructions, e.g., 138A,201F (Duty
of Vigilance of Driver), 144A(Speed). Such instruction should also
be related to both the jurors and to the facts of the case being tried
by the jurors.
It should be noted that the hypothesized instructions do not use
the term "negligence." This is so for two reasons. First, the term
"negligence" is technical in nature and possibly subject to misinter-
pretation by the jury. Secondly, it has been excluded to help us break
away from the "word-magic" 18 philosophy which often pervades the
instructing process. This philosophy is that we must use the language
of BAJI exclusively which of course raises the implication that the
27 47 Cal. 2d 457, 303 P.2d 1041 (1956).
28 Word-magic: magic involving the use of words in a manner determined by a belief
that the very art of uttering a word summons or directly affects the person or thing that
the word refers to. WEBSTER, NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (3rd ed. 1961).
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words themselves (separate from the meanings they convey) have
some intrinsic importance.
We use terms like "reasonably prudent person," "negligence," and
"proximate cause" because we are afraid to use other terms, not be-
cause these are descriptive of a relationship which must be conveyed
to the jury. Undoubtedly, the suggested instruction can be greatly
improved upon by imaginative counsel and judges, keeping in mind
that the object of the instruction is to communicate to the jury and to
meaningfully describe a relationship which gives rise to certain legal
consequences in terms that are understandable to the trier of fact,
rather than in terms which are meaningful only to one with a legal
education.
Let us use another example:29
On a rainy day plaintiff fell at the entrance of defendant company's
store. At the time she fell she was on a slab of terrazo tile outside the
closed door, which she was in the process of opening. The tile was
wet. At the trial the plaintiff contended that the terrazo tile was ex-
cessively slippery, creating an unreasonable risk of slipping, particu-
larly in wet weather. Defendant contended that plaintiff was con-
tributorily negligent in hurrying to get into the store and in wearing
a type of shoe with a slick sole; it being contended that the shoes
created a greater risk of injury to herself than ordinary care would
permit. Each of the parties, as is the usual practice, proposed a number
of jury instructions.30
The requested instructions from BAJI, (213 and 213(c) as modi-
fied), deal with the responsibility of an invitor for injuries to an
invitee. A reading of these instructions will reveal that they are ex-
pressed in terms peculiarly familiar to lawyers; 31 terms which are
29This example and the suggested instruction are from a case tried before the writer.
30 Plaintiff requested BAJI Instructions 1-5, 7, 8, 21-25, 30, 33, 101A-D, 1011, 102-
04, 133, 171, 171A, 103A-B, 172C.1, 173A, 174, 174A-D, 213E (with minor modifica-
tions).
Defendant requested BAJI Instructions 213, 213C (with modifications), 103.1
(Supp.), 102A (Supp.), 102, 101 (Supp.), 132.1, 133, 136, 138C (Supp.), 207D (with
minor adaptations), 2131, 103B, 104, 116, 140, 180, 139, lOIB (modified).
3' One who goes upon the premises of another as a business visitor, at the express
or implied invitation of the owner, and in connection with some mutual business interest
with the owner or with the latter's own business, is called in law an invitee. 2 BAJI 213C.
Defendant's 213C (with modifications): "Toward an invitee, it is the duty of an
occupier of property to use ordinary care to keep the premises in a condition reasonably
safe for the invitee.
But the responsibility of one having control of the premises is not absolute; it is
limited to the performance of certain duties defined in my instructions. If there is danger
attending upon the entry, and if such danger arises from conditions not readily apparent
to the senses, and if the occupant has actual knowledge of them, or if they are discover-
able by it in the exercise of ordinary care, it is its duty to give reasonable warning of
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uncommon and only rarely used in everyday conversation. It will
also be noted that both parties request the giving of these instructions
as well as the instructions on negligence and ordinary care. If one
were to read these instructions together with the requested instructions
on contributory negligence and proximate cause and then pause to
reflect upon the meaning which is conveyed to a lay jury by such a
reading, the conclusion seems inescapable that the instructions will
not be understood. A simplified instruction might read as follows:
"Ladies and Gentlemen: the law requires that you and I exercise
the same amount of care as would an ordinarily careful person in
the light of all of the surrounding circumstances. If either party
to this action did not exercise that amount of care, then such party
was negligent.
"You will notice that I said that we are all required to exercise a
certain amount of care. In this connection, it is not the extra cautious
person nor the exceptionally skilful one that we have to follow in our
actions, but it is the ordinarily careful person. From the foregoing it
follows that we are concerned in this case with whether D Company
acted as an ordinarily careful person under the circumstances. Did
D Company use that care which persons of ordinary carefulness, op-
erating a department store such as D Company's, would use to avoid
injury to customers entering the store? The amount of caution re-
quired of D Company depends upon the danger to customers which
is apparent to D Company, or which should have been apparent to
them as an ordinarily careful firm from the construction, maintenance
or control of the terrazo area at the Blank Street entrance of their
store under the circumstances shown by the evidence.
"If a person of ordinary carefulness, with the same knowledge and
in the same position as D Company, would have foreseen that someone
might be injured as a result of the construction, maintenance or control
of the terrazo area under the circumstances shown by the evidence
and if this risk of injury to customers reasonably could be avoided,
such danger to the invitee. The occupant is not bound to discover defects which reason-
able inspection would not disclose, and it is entitled to assume that the invitee will per-
ceive that which would be obvious to her upon the ordinary use of her own senses. In
brief, no duty exists to give the invitee notice of an obvious danger.
In the absence of appearances that caution her, or would caution a reasonably pru-
dent person in like position, to the contrary, the invitee has a right to assume that the
premises she was invited to enter are reasonably safe for the purposes for which the in-
vitation was extended, and to act on that assumption.
Each, the invitee and the occupant, so long as she or it is exercising ordinary care
and no circumstance exists that either causes her or it or would cause a reasonably pru-
dent person in her or its position to think differently, has a right to assume that the other
is or will be possessed of normal faculties of sight and hearing and will exercise ordinary
care, and has the right to rely on that assumption."
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then not to avoid it would be negligence on the part of D Company.
"It follows therefrom that D Company has the duty of exercising
the same amount of care as a person of ordinary carefulness so as not
unnecessarily to expose Mrs. P to danger or accident, and to that end
to keep in a reasonably safe condition the entrance way to the store
premises.
"If there was a danger created at the entrance way and if such
danger arose from conditions not readily apparent to the senses, and
if D Company created such conditions or had actual knowledge of
them or if they were discoverable by D Company in the exercise of
ordinary care, it was its duty to give reasonable warning of such danger
to Mrs. P. Of course, D Company was entitled to assume that Mrs. P
would see that which would be obvious to her upon the usual use of
her eyes. In short, D Company had no duty to give her notice of an
apparent danger.
Mrs. P, however, had a right to assume that the Blank Street en-
trance of the D Company's store was reasonably safe for use and to act
on that assumption unless it was apparent to her or would have been
apparent to an ordinarily careful person that caution was in order.
"Each, D Company and Mrs. P, so long as she or it is exercising
ordinary care and no circumstance exists that either causes or would
cause an ordinarily careful person in the same position to think dif-
ferently, has a right to assume that the other is possessed of normal
faculties of sight and will act as a person of ordinary carefulness, and
each has a right to rely on that assumption.
"In considering Mrs. P, we are concerned with whether she acted
as an ordinarily careful person under the circumstances. Did she use
that care which persons of ordinary carefulness entering a department
store on a rainy day would use to avoid injury to themselves? The
amount of caution required of Mrs. P depends upon the danger to
herself which was apparent to her or which should have been apparent
to her as an ordinarily careful person from entering the Blank Street
entrance of the D Company store dressed as she was under the cir-
cumstances shown by the evidence.
"If a person of ordinary carefulness, with the same knowledge and
in the same position as Mrs. P, would have foreseen that she might be
injured as a result of entering the D Company store, dressed as she
was, under the circumstances shown by the evidence, and if this risk
of injury to herself could reasonably have been avoided, then not to
avoid it would be negligence on the part of Mrs. P. In short, then, if
D Company did not conform to the standard of care required of it
May, 1962] THE INSTRUCTION RITUAL
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then it was negligent. If Mrs. P did not conform to the standard of
care required of her, then she was negligent."32
The foregoing proposed instruction unlike the earlier one uses the
term "negligent," not because the term is necessary in this instruction
but merely because it seemed appropriate in the pattern of these
particular instructions. On the other hand the terms "invitor" and
"invitee" are not used in these instructions because there is no reason
for their use. The persons designated by BAJI as invitor and invitee
can readily be referred to by name. Certainly the term "customer" is
preferable to the term "invitee" for the term "customer" is a term by
which the jurors might readily describe themselves in speaking of
their relationship to a store. On the other hand most of us would con-
sider the use of the term "invitee" in ordinary conversation to be a
rather peculiar affectation and would probably label the user as being
somewhat eccentric.3 3 In any event, for the reasons previously indi-
cated, since such terms are rarely used by the lay public, they should
32 A similar factually oriented form is set forth in SPEISER, NEGLIGENCE JURY
CHARGES (1961) as follows:
"If you should find after carefully weighing all of the believable evidence that, as
the plaintiff contends, she slipped and sustained her alleged injuries, as a proximate cause
of the dampness or wetness of the floors in defendant owner's lobby, you must consider
the following rules of law:
First, since the plaintiff concededly was lawfully upon the defendant's premises as
a patron, the defendant owed her the duty of maintaining the lobby floors in a reasonably
safe condition, under all of the then existing circumstances just prior to her alleged fall.
You can consider the weather conditions that night; the number of patrons tracking up
the lobby floors with wet feet; the steps which the defendant owner allegedly took to
keep the lobby floors mopped and dry, including the use of a mat; and whether or not
the mat should have covered the entire lobby floor; as well as any other believable evi-
dence, bearing upon the condition and reasonable safety of this lobby floor before plain-
tiff's alleged fall.
Second, you cannot find the defendant owner negligent for allegedly maintaining wet
or damp floors, unless you first find, after carefully evaluating all of the credible evi-
dence, that defendant failed to exercise the care of a reasonably prudent owner under
substantially similar circumstances prevailing on the night of the plaintiff's alleged fall,
after it became aware of, or should have become aware of, an allegedly damp lobby floor,
which could reasonably be foreseen as a hazard to the reasonable safety of its patrons."
An examination of other forms in that work reveals a conscientious effort to inte-
grate facts into the instructions. This may be partly because the Form Book has been
designed for use in New York where the court has specifically disapproved abstract in-
structions. See Clancy v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 128 App. Div. 141, 143, 112 N.Y.
Supp. 541, 543 (2d Dep't 1908), where the court says: "A mere legal essay does not
suffice; a specific and concrete instruction as to the fact or facts on which, if found,
negligence may be based, is requisite." See also Phillips v. Roux Labs., 286 App. Div.
549, 145 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1st Dep't 1955); Richardson v. Nassau Elec. R.R., 190 App.
Div. 529, 180 N.Y. Supp. 109 (2d Dep't 1920).
s3 Furthermore, it is apparently considered a technical term for it is defined in BAJI
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be avoided in instructions and the more common language should
be used.
With an instruction such as that given it will be necessary that we
also instruct the jury on the consequences which flow from the finding
that either party or both are negligent. 4
Instructions on Proximate Cause
Almost every jury case is burdened with unintelligible instructions
on proximate cause.35 It is unquestionably true that for negligence to
be actionable, it must be the proximate cause of an injury. While this
is a legal truth, factually proximate cause is often not an issue in the
case.30 In spite of this the instruction will invariably be suggested by
counsel for both sides and will be given in a negligence case. The
wisdom of giving proximate cause instructions as confusing as those
set forth in BAJI is certainly questionable, particularly in a case where
the negligence, if any, was factually the cause (in a proximate cause
sense) as a matter of law. It is submitted that in this situation the
proximate cause issue should be removed from the jury and the jury
advised that responsibility flows from the negligence without any
mention of proximate cause."7
In the slip and fall case which we have hypothesized above, which
was actually tried before the writer, it was admitted that the terrazo
34 Where the negligent conduct if established is a proximate cause of the injury as
a matter of law, it might be advisable to inform the jury of the consequences flowing
therefrom in the following manner: "If you find Plaintiff not negligent and Defendant
negligent then your verdict shall be for Plaintiff. If you find Plaintiff negligent and De-
fendant not negligent or Plaintiff and Defendant both negligent then your verdict shall
be for Defendant."
35 "The proximate cause of an injury is that cause which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without
which the result would not have occurred. It is the efficient cause-the one that neces-
sarily sets in operation the factors that accomplish the injury." I BAJI 104.
"This does not mean that the law seeks and recognizes only one proximate cause of
an injury, consisting of only one factor, one act, one element of circumstance, or the
conduct of only one person. To the contrary, the acts and omissions of two or more per-
sons may work concurrently as the efficient cause of an injury, and in such a case, each
of the participating acts or omissions is regarded in the law as a proximate cause." 1
BAJI 104A.
To give rise to liability, however, or to constitute contributory negligence, any such
proximate cause must have consisted of negligent conduct.
30 "Not only in the instances I have mentioned, but in every case the jury must find
the facts as to conduct from which it would follow as a matter of law, whether such con-
duct was a proximate cause of the injury." Justice Shinn in Werkman v. Howard Zink
Corp., 97 Cal. App. 2d 418, 431, 218 P.2d 43, 51 (1950).
S7 Matters which are established as a matter of law should not be submitted to the
jury. See Vasquez v. Alameda, 49 Cal. 2d 674, 321 P.2d 1 (1958); Huebotter v. Follett,
27 Cal. 2d 765, 167 P.2d 193 (1946); People v. Geijsbeek, 153 Cal. App. 2d 300, 314
P.2d 21 (1957).
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was slippery and the plaintiff slipped and fell. It seemed obvious that
if the defendants were negligent, their negligence was a proximate
cause of the injury as a matter of law and that no instructions should
be given on the subject. Again, with respect to plaintiff's contributory
negligence, if plaintiff was negligent, it was because by running she cre-
ated an unreasonable risk of slipping or because the shoes she wore
created an unreasonable risk of slipping. Plaintiff did slip. If she slipped
in part because of the running or the nature of the shoes, then, as a mat-
ter of law there is proximate cause. It would seem therefor that there is
no need to instruct on the subject. Looking to the definition of "prox-
imate cause" we find that the condition of the terrazo tile on the one
hand and the running and the condition of the shoes on the other
were each a cause which is unbroken by any efficient intervening
cause, a near cause effective at the time of the injury, immediately
preceding and leading into the injury, and continuing to the time of
the injury. Each was at least one of the causes which set in operation
the factors which accomplished the injury.
Neither side considered that there was any possibility of an inter-
vening cause for neither side suggested an instruction on that subject
as set forth in BAJI 104C, and both stipulated that there was no prox-
imate cause issue and no need to instruct on that subject. It is sub-
mitted that even in the absence of such a stipulation the proximate
causation issue was established as a matter of law and that such in-
structions would only tend to confuse the jury. It should be adequate
to advise the jury that if the defendant's neglect in constructing and
maintaining the slab caused the fall, then the defendant company was
responsible for the injuries sustained unless the specific negligence of
the plaintiff contributed to causing the fall, in which case the plaintiff
could not recover.
The fact that "proximate cause" is often misunderstood is well
illustrated by the frequent lay misinterpretation of the term to be
"approximate" cause. The nature of the term is such that its use should
be discarded unless we are to cling to a belief that words have certain
mystical properties.
Other BAJI Instructions
So far this article has not dealt with the subject of general instruc-
tions as set forth in BAJI. Since this article is not intended as a critical
analysis of all of the instructions of BAJI, no detailed analysis will be
attempted. This is primarily an attempt to show a way to properly use
that fine work as an aid to instructing. Some of the general instructions
in BAJI could be greatly improved by eliminating the terms which are
uncommon. This may be illustrated by reference to a BAJI instruction
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on 'Witnesses." It will be noted that the instruction speaks in terms
of "credibility of the witness," and also in terms of "impeaching the
witness."2' 8 It is the experience of the writer that such terms are rarely
used outside of the courtroom from which it follows that their use in
the courtroom should be avoided. Since, in this instruction, we are
attempting to tell the jury how to judge witnesses, how to decide what
to believe and what not to believe, why not use the obvious term "be-
lievability" for "credibility." The term "believability" has the advan-
tage of being much more commonly used and avoids the similarity of
sounds which are found in the words "credibility" and "creditability."
To jurors unused to using the term "credibility" it is quite likely that
it could be confused with the term "creditability" thereby causing a
juror to think that the financial solvency of a particular witness was
a relevant consideration in evaluating his testimony.
The term "impeachment" is even worse. It is used to suggest to
the jurors situations when they might wish to question the testimony of
the witness with extra care. But why use a term which many of the
jury have only heard in a context relating to the removal of an official
from public office? Instead of saying that a witness may be "im-
peached," say that "the testimony of a witness may be brought into
question by." The foregoing changes in jury instructions are not offered
as a verbatim substitute for the language proposed by BAJI but are
set forth only to show that the language of BAJI is not the only lan-
guage which may be used. No particular form of statement should
be regarded as unchangeable.
Manner and Time of Instructing
As indicated earlier, reading an instruction directly from BAJI or
from a printed reproduction of the applicable instructions therein is a
common method of instructing. We have indicated that the language
of BAJI is the language of lawyers not laymen. Since the unfamiliar
is not grasped and understood as readily as the familiar, extra effort
38 BAJI 26 (Supp. 1959) provides: "In judging the credibility of witnesses, includ-
ing any party who has testified, you shall have in mind the law that a witness is presumed
to speak the truth. A witness, however, may be impeached and this presumption over-
come by contradictory evidence; by the manner of the witness on the stand; the degree
of intelligence exhibited by him; the character of his testimony; by evidence showing his
motive or interest in the outcome of the case or his bias or prejudice for or against one
of the parties; by evidence that on some former occasion he made a statement or state-
ments inconsistent with his present testimony; by evidence adversely affecting the char-
acter of the witness for truth, honesty or integrity; by proof that he has been convicted
of a felony.
You will note that I do not say that any of the matters I have mentioned do over-
come the presumption that the witness is speaking the truth; I only say that they may
overcome that presumption. It is for you to decide whether they do or not."
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should be made to make these legal principles understood. Our de-
livery may be an aid in this endeavor. It should be such as to hold
the attention of the jury. We must avoid monotony. This we cannot
do if we spend an hour reading impersonal abstract propositions of
law. We will inevitably lose the jury's attention and with it our ability
to inform them of the things which they must know. This problem
was recognized by Justice Shinn in a notable concurring opinion in
Workman v. Howard Zink Corp.: "I also believe that juries are usually
instructed at such length and with such a superfluity of words and
phrases as to make it impossible for them to separate the wheat from
the chaff."3 9
If we speak directly to the jury in a personalized manner during
the so-called general instructions, we will be less likely to lose their
attention. Furthermore, we may thereby be better able to retain their
attention during the reading of specially prepared liability instructions.
The key instructions, the liability instructions, probably should be
specially prepared for each case using the principles above indicated.
Due to their special applicability to the particular case, it will prob-
ably be necessary to read the particular instructions but both the read
and the non-read instructions should avoid the pompous use of unusual
terms and should be delivered in a personal and conversational manner.
It should be here acknowledged, however, that one appellate court
has disapproved oral instructions on the grounds of safety.40 It seems
to the writer that this is a misemphasis of the proper balance between
safety and understandability. Furthermore, actual experience with the
technique suggested has shown the writer that inadvertent error can
be and is generally avoided and that the response and attention of the
jury to the instructing process justifies the use of the suggested proce-
dure over a more formal (albeit safer) approach.
When we come to consider the time for instructing we are again
mindful of the purpose of our instructions. Being thus mindful, we
should instruct at whatever time or times are most conducive to that
purpose.
Some light might be shed on this subject by considering a case
tried by a judge without a jury. From the beginning the judge is gen-
erally familiar with the principles of law involved in the case. It is
not difficult to imagine how much more difficult it would be to sort
the important from the unimportant without this prior knowledge of
the law. It would seem that the jury should also know the legal prin-
ciples applicable to the case to be tried by them, at the beginning of
39 Werkman v. Howard Zink Corp., 97 Cal. App. 2d 418, 428, 218 P.2d 43, 50
(1950).
40 Martin v. Los Angeles Turf Club, Inc., 39 Cal. App. 2d 338, 103 P.2d 188 (1940).
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the case. Judge Leon David has indicated that it is the uniform prac-
tice in Los Angeles to preinstruct the jury.4 The writer has also done
this and experience has indicated that it is a most effective time to
communicate with the jury. It might be done before the jury is im-
panelled or at any time thereafter. My own practice has been to
preinstruct after the opening statements using information from the
opening statements to attempt to provide a minimum amount of per-
sonalization of the early instructions.
It would also seem that instructions should be given to the jury
during the course of the trial when such instructions can be supplied
without overemphasis on any particular point and when the nature of
the instruction will permit, e.g., instruction on expert witnesses will be
more meaningful to the jury at the time an expert witness is called to
the stand. Sometimes damage instructions can be appropriately given
at the time a witness is called to testify to matters relating solely to
damage. An instruction on the jury's attitude toward objections by.
counsel, given at the time of the first objection, will carry extra
meaning.
A judge, alert to the events in his courtroom should be able to find
frequent opportunity to inform the jury of the legal principles of the
case. If this procedure is followed, the instructions at the conclusion
of the trial will be a tying together of everything that has gone before
and should probably begin by a personalized restatement of the issues,
followed by the carefully prepared special instruction on liability, and
any special issues presented by the case. Only after these instructions
are given should we repeat the general instructions, most of which
were given at the beginning and during the trial.
Conclusion
By now it is obvious that the writer is not satisfied with the way
in which BAJI is being used by counsel and by the courts. This is not
the fault of BAJI. It is an indispensable tool in the preparation of the
individualized jury instructions contemplated by this article. Its mis-
use is partly due to the very excellence of the work and partly to a
desire by the courts for a safe and sure non-reversible instruction. The
attitude that the court must at all costs be correct even at the expense
of understandability makes an instruction that has been approved by
the appellate court very easy for the trial court to adopt as the most
satisfactory form in which to state the law. The risk of a reversal is
eliminated by the approval. Since the appellate court can never tell
whether or not an instruction was understood, its attention has been
primarily directed to the question of whether or not the instruction
41 Article, David, J., Making Effective Use of the Jury.
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correctly states the law. It is only natural that this should also become
the main concern of the trial court.
I do not wish to imply by anything I have stated herein that the
trial court should not be concerned with the accuracy of its statement
of the law. While it should be so concerned it should not make any
sacrifice of understandability. We, as trial judges, and trial lawyers
must realize that the approval of certain instructions by an appellate
court is not equivalent to a statement that the language in the ap-
proved instruction is the best language to be used. With the variety
of expression available in the English language it is certain that there
are many forms in which any of our instructions can be stated cor-
rectly and understandably. We should constantly strive to accomplish
both of these objectives. It has been demonstrated in our courts re-
peatedly that the facts of each case differ from every other. If this
be so, it follows also that meaningful instructions in each case will
differ from every other. This will mean that inevitably the courts will
be giving instructions in language which has not been approved. The
writer's experience, however, has been that with the aid of BAJI all
of the essential elements can be incorporated in an understandable
instruction, patterned to the individual case. It is further the view of
this writer that the judge should be willing to run the risk of a reversal
by reason of an inadvertent error in his instructions in a conscientious
effort to make his instructions meaningful. Approval and safety of
instructions cannot be the sine qua non of our instructing process.
When the question has come up, the appellate courts have indicated
the desirability of making instructions understandable and have stated
that general instructions are adequate unless specific instructions are
requested.42 They have thereby inferentially indicated a preference
for the specific.
The California Supreme Court in Guerra v. Handlery Hotels, Inc.,
stated: "It cannot be overemphasized that instructions should be clear
and simple in order to avoid misleading the jury."43 This statement
was made without an analysis of the requirements for a "clear and
simple" instruction. We do, however, have a limited number of guides
from other decisions. It has, for example, been held that where tech-
nical terms have been used in an instruction, the instruction should
include a definition of those terms.44 It has been held that where
42 Hildebrand v. Los Angeles Junction Ry., 53 Cal. 2d 826, 3 Cal. Rptr. 313, 350
P.2d 65 (1960); Stafford v. Alexander, 182 Cal. App. 2d 301, 6 Cal. Rptr. 219 (1960).
43 53 Cal. 2d 266, 272, 1 Cal. Rptr. 330, 333, 347 P.2d 674, 677 (1959).
44 Clark v. State of California, 99 Cal. App. 2d 616, 222 P.2d 300 (1950); Corvello
v. Baumsteiger, 115 Cal. App. 194, 1 P.2d 484 (1931); 2 WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCE-
DURE § 59 (1954).
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issues are established or eliminated as a matter of law, the court may
take these particular issues from the jury.45 Cases dealing with argu-
mentative and formula instructions, while not inconsistent with the
suggestions set forth herein, do point up the need for careful drafts-
manship by counsel and the court.4 6
In conclusion, we have attempted to show that BAJI is almost uni-
versally used in instructing juries. It is improperly used in that it
has become a substitute for individualized, personalized instructions
adapted to the facts of the particular case. We must not permit safe,
approved instructions to become our goal to the exclusion of under-
standable instructions. The jury instruction process must be one of
communication of concepts from judge to jury in a meaningful way.
When necessary for clarity the balance should be in favor of an un-
tested specific instruction against an approved abstract instruction.
The challenge before us was set forth by Justice Shinn when he stated:
"The rules of law applicable to the ordinary case can be stated simply
and in language a layman can understand. But what is more important,
they can easily be made to fit the facts of the case."47 This is the task
of trial counsel and the court in every jury case. We can neither avoid
it nor shrink from it if jury instructions are to be more than a ritual-
istic adjunct to a trial.
45 See cases cited note 37 supra.
4 0 2 WrrKaN, CALiORNoIA PocEDuruE § 62 (1954), and cases cited therein.
47 Werkman v. Howard Zink Corp., 97 Cal. App. 2d 418, 431, 218 P.2d 43, 51
(1950).
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